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Some Constitutional Implications of
Denying NEA Subsidies to Arts
Projects Under the Yates
Compromise
by
KAREN FAABORG*

As a general rule, government subsidies of speech activities have no
constitutional implications, and courts have been reluctant to interfere
with government discretion in administering direct and indirect subsidy
programs.' The rationale behind this rule is that there is no right to
public support of private expression, and no liberty or property interest
in a government grant; this principle has been applied to support programs for the arts.2 The recently promulgated funding bill for the National Endowment on the Arts forces a reevaluation of this principle
because it bars federal funds for arts projects which are "obscene." 3 This
Essay raises two constitutional grounds on which the new legislation
might be successfully challenged: (1) it politicizes the grant process by
inserting a government official as censor, and (2) it allows subject matter
discrimination to occur without the strict scrutiny safeguards designed to
avoid illicit prior restraints and the chilling of first amendment rights.
The Yates Compromise requires the Chairperson of the National
Endowment for the Arts (NEA) to monitor all awards to arts projects
and to withhold funding from any judged to be obscene.4 Obscenity is
defined in the legislation as "including but not limited to, depictions of
*
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1. See Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
2. See Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 894 (1976).
3. Dep't of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101121 § 304, 103 Stat. 741-42 (1989). This so-called Yates Compromise was crafted by Sidney
Yates (D.-Ill.) who successfully breached the gap between restriction-minded members of Congress, such as Jesse Helms, and such artistic freedom advocacy groups as The American Council on the Arts. See also 135 CONG. REC. 512,967-01 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1989); 135 CONG. REC.
H6466-04 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989).

4. Id.
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sadomasochism, homo-eroticism, the sexual exploitation of children, or
individuals engaged in sex acts, and which, when taken as a whole, do
not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value." 5 Because
the Chairperson is an administrative appointee, 6 this requirement
politicizes the grantmaking process, which until now was controlled by
decisionmaking panels comprised of citizens familiar with the arts.'
David Shiffrin, a prominent legal scholar, has elucidated the constitutional hazards implicit in such a scheme by drawing an analogy to
broadcasting and educational areas.' In both of these areas, centralized
control has been rejected by the courts as violating the first amendment.9
The broadcasting system is completely decentralized and is in the hands
of literally hundreds of licensees. If the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) were to substitute its decision for those of the licensees,
the purpose of the first amendment as the guardian of an "uninhibited
marketplace of ideas" would be abrogated.'
Similarly, the principle
of academic freedom liberates teachers from the "pall of orthodoxy"
which centralized control engenders." As Shiffrin points out, the important feature in both systems, beyond the requirement for multiple decisionmakers, is the fact that these decisionmakers are nonpolitical private
citizens.12 The insertion of the NEA chairperson into the decisionmaking processes of the hundreds of private citizens who comprise the panels
which allocate grant monies is subject to the same constitutional
principles.
The decisionmaking panels at the NEA engage continuously in content-based discrimination, most of which is constitutional and entirely
valid. Prior to the Yates Compromise, content discrimination was limited to determining whether the project exhibited substantial artistic and
cultural significance and excellence. 13 Content neutrality covers different
kinds of neutrality, including viewpoint neutrality and subject matter
neutrality, in addition to quality neutrality. 4 Viewpoint neutrality requires that the decision maker reflect no bias regarding the opinions ex5. Id.
6. 20 U.S.C. § 954(b)(1) (1988).
7. See 20 U.S.C. § 959 (1988).
8. Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 565, 644-47 (1980).
9. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Mt. Mansfield
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967).
10. See Red Lion, 394 U.S. at 390.
11. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
12. Shiffrin, supra note 8, at 646.

13.
14.

20 U.S.C. § 954(e) (1988).
M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF

THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 2.07 (1984).
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pressed by the artist on matters of public concern. Subject matter
neutrality makes a similar demand with regard to materials or topics
treated by the artist. Quality neutrality would require no bias in the
quality of the artistic product itself.
Both viewpoint and subject matter neutrality are required in the
NEA decisionmaking process, whereas, quality neutrality is not necessary. The empowering legislation, the National Foundation on the Arts
and the Humanities Act, charges the NEA with fostering the excellence
of the arts in the United States. 5 Clearly, the NEA has the right to
engage in quality-based discrimination because funds are limited.
In order to ensure that viewpoint or subject matter considerations
are not made under the guise of artistic quality decisions, it is essential to
give the entire responsibility for granting subsidies to nonpolitical art and
cultural experts. 6 Viewpoint neutrality is always required; this is the
very essence of first amendment protection of differing political views.
Subject matter neutrality is examined with strict scrutiny in order to ensure that the differentiation serves a compelling state interest.'"
The Yates Compromise inserts subject matter differentiation into
the grantmaking process. For example, under the new legislation, in deciding whether to fund a theater project, the NEA is required to monitor
the project for any subject matter which could be considered obscene. If
the project could be considered obscene, the NEA must withhold funding. It is more likely, however, that the theater-producing organization
will exercise self-censorship and cut out any potentially offensive plays
rather than lose the grant. Under conventional first amendment analysis,
such subject matter distinctions are presumptively invalid.'"
The Yates Compromise also forces the NEA to exercise a prior restraint on the various arts projects it subsidizes. In the analogous area of
public forum law, such a prior restraint is invalid without proper procedural safeguards.' 9 The settled rule is from Freedman v. Maryland:2 ° a
system of prior restraint "avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes
place under procedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a
censorship system."'" In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, Justice Blackmun recites the "deeply etched" principle that "a free society
15. National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, 79
Stat. 845 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C §§ 951-977 (1989)).
16. Sobel, First Amendment Standardsfor Government Subsidies of Artistic and Cultural
Expression: A Reply to Justices Scalia and Rehnquist, 41 VAND. L. REV. 517, 527 (1988).
17. M. NIMMER, supra note 14, § 2.07, at 2-103.
18. Id. § 4.09[D], at 4-83.
19. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
20. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
21. Id. at 58.
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prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand." 22 Justice Blackmun adopts the Freedman safeguards for theatrical productions:
First,the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that
the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor.
Second, any restraint prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a
specified brief period and only for the purpose of preserving the status
quo.

Third, a prompt final judicial determination must be assured. 23
The Yates Compromise offers no such procedural safeguards. Rather, it
puts all the power for distinguishing obscene from non-obscene subject
matter into the hands of elected or appointed officials.
A more recent case dealing with the public forum-theater, Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank,2 4 summarizes the constitutional problems
inherent in the Yates Compromise:
When decisions about what forms of expression will be permitted or
which individuals will be allowed to express themselves in a public
forum are made by a political body ... those decisions must be scruti-

nized most carefully-if only because such a body is at all times, by its
very nature, the object of political pressures. Regrettably, at times the
will of the majority may for the moment run contrary to the protections that the first amendment
affords political and other controversial
25
forms of expression.
In the opinion, Judge Reinhardt went on to explain that a professional
museum director's or concert promoter's decision regarding exhibits or
performance selections would have a better chance of surviving first
amendment scrutiny than a similar decision made by elected or appointed officials. 26 Clearly, the Yates Compromise is not on firm constitutional ground under a public forum analysis.
Unfortunately, however, there is reason to believe that the Yates
Compromise would be upheld if it were challenged before today's United
States Supreme Court. In 1987, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Rehnquist, wrote a dissenting opinion which seemed to indicate that he would
support unfettered government involvement in the grantmaking process.
The case, Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, did not
provide a natural setting for what became a lengthy diatribe by the dissenters; the majority had held that a state sales tax on general interest
magazines, which exempts newspapers and religious, professional, trade,
and sports journals violates the first amendment's guarantee of freedom
22.
23.
24.
25.

420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (emphasis in original).
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975) (emphasis added).
745 F.2d 560 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 575.
26. Id. at 575-76.
27. Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1730 (1987).
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of speech because it distinguishes among publications on the basis of
content.2 8
Justice Scalia argued that tax exemptions are a form of subsidy and
that a government decision to subsidize some, but not all speech, is "not
subject to strict scrutiny. ' 29 The shocking aspect of Scalia's dissent is his
use of artistic examples; Scalia referred to the Kennedy Center's authorization to present classical music, opera, drama, dance, and poetry; and
the Center's right to exclude lectures and political speeches as examples
of subject matter distinction that do not require strict scrutiny.3 ° Because he offered no analysis, Scalia left open the possibility that he believes the decision to subsidize some but not all subject matter in the arts
does not demand strict scrutiny. Rehnquist's joining in this dissent is
reminiscent of his remarkably similar dissent many years ago in Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad,3 a public-forum case. Both Scalia's and
Rehnquist's dissenting opinions indicate that the Yates Compromise may
have a friendly audience should it ever be tested before the Supreme
Court.
Even more unfortunately, the only case on point to serve as precedent in such a hearing is Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson,32 which held
that the refusal of the Governor and Council of New Hampshire to approve a grant from the Commission on the Arts to a literary magazine,
on the grounds that it had published a poem which contained language
and imagery that some might find offensive, did not violate the first or
fourteenth amendment rights of the plaintiff.3 3 Although this holding
flies in the face of the constitutional principles that have been articulated
in this Essay, and in spite of the fact that it has been roundly repudiated
by Professor Shiffrin and others,34 it nonetheless provides a foothold for
those who would support the new legislation.

28. 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1727-28 (1987).
29. Id. at 1731 (quoting Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
544 (1983)).
30. Id. at 1732.
31. 420 U.S. at 571-72.
32. 532 F.2d 792 (lst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
33. Id. at 798.
34. See Shiffrin, supra note 8, at 646.

